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Pragmatic ordering: Informality, experimentation and the maritime security 
agenda 
Christian Bueger, University of Copenhagen 
Timothy Edmunds, University of Bristol 
 
Abstract: The question of when and how international orders change remains a pertinent 
issue of international relations theory. This article develops the model of pragmatic ordering 
to conceptualise change. The model of pragmatic ordering synthesises recent theoretical 
arguments for a focus on ordering advanced in practice theory, pragmatist philosophy and 
related approaches. It also integrates evidence from recent global governance research. We 
propose a five-stage model. According to the model, once a new problem emerges 
(problematisation), informality allows for experimenting with new practices and developing 
new knowledge (informalisation and experimentation). Once these experimental practices 
become codified, and survive contestation, they increasingly settle (codification) and are 
spread through learning and translation processes (consolidation). We draw on the rise of the 
maritime security agenda as a paradigmatic case and examine developments in the Western 
Indian Ocean region to illustrate each of these stages. The article draws attention to the 
substantial reorganisation of maritime space occurring over the past decade and offers an 
innovative approach for the study of orders and change.  
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1. Introduction: The transformation of order at sea 
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A substantial shift in the political evaluation of maritime space has taken place over the past 
decades. The oceans have re-emerged as a problematic space in international politics. Maritime 
inter-state rivalries in the Arctic, the South China Sea and elsewhere question existing 
institutions and the law of the sea.1 Transnational maritime crimes, including piracy, illegal 
fishing, trafficking of people or smuggling of illicit goods increasingly occupy the international 
security agenda,2 while the rise of China and India as naval powers questions the naval 
hegemony of the United States.3  
These new challenges have confounded the relatively settled international maritime order of 
the immediate post-Cold War period. A range of complex, interconnected and globalised 
challenges have emerged, against which the established norms and practices have struggled to 
cope. This article demonstrates that we witness not necessarily a rise of disorder at sea, but the 
emergence of a new ordering processes. This transformation serves us as an empirical case to 
advance a new model for understanding international ordering.  
Drawing on and advancing recent arguments for shifting the analytical perspective from order 
and change to processes of ordering, we develop a five-stage model of ordering practices in 
the light of empirical evidence drawn from maritime space. As a growing range of authors have 
shown, the move from noun to verb is productive as order can be analysed as an effect of 
 
1 Jonathan D. Caverley and Peter Dombrowski, ‘Too Important to be left to the Admirals: The Need 
to Study Maritime Great Power Competition’, Security Studies, 29:4 (2020), pp. 579-600; Felix K. 
Chang, ‘China’s Naval Rise and the South China Sea: An Operational Assessment’, Orbis, 56:1 
(2012), pp. 19-38 ; Douglas Guilfoyle, ‘The Rule of Law and Maritime Security: Understanding 
Lawfare in the South China Sea’, International Affairs, 95:5 (2019), pp. 999-1017; Kathrin Keil, ‘The 
Arctic: A New Region of Conflict? The Case of Oil and Gas’, Cooperation and Conflict, 49:2 (2013), 
pp. 162–90; James Kraska, Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011).  
2 Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, ‘Blue Crime: Conceptualising Transnational Organised 
Crime at Sea’, Marine Policy, 119 (2020); Peter Lehr, Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global 
Terrorism (London & New York: Routledge, 2007); Martin N. Murphy, Small Boats, Weak States, 
Dirty Money: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World (London, C Hurst & Co Publishers 
Ltd, 2010); Sarah Percy, ‘Counter-Piracy in the Indian Ocean: A New Form of Military Cooperation’, 
Journal of Global Security Studies, 1:4 (2016), pp. 270-284. Christian Bueger and Jessica Larsen, 
Maritime Insecurities, in The Routledge Handbook of Peace, Security and Development, edited by Fen 
Osler Hampson, Alpaslan Özerdem, and Jonathan Kent, (London, Routledge, 149-163, 2020). 
3 David Michel and Russel Sticklohr, Indian Ocean Rising: Maritime Security and Policy Challenges 
(Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, 2012); Robert S. Ross, ‘China’s Naval Nationalism: Sources, 
Prospects, and the U.S. Response’, International Security, 34:2 (2009), pp. 46–81. 
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ongoing ordering moves.4 Order is an achievement, rather than a given. Ordering thus shifts 
attention to processes.  
The model of pragmatic ordering advanced in this article proposes a much-needed heuristic 
for empirically studying such processes. Providing a synthesis of recent theoretical arguments 
and empirical global governance research, we identify five stages of an ordering process: 
problematisation, informalisation, experimentation, codification and consolidation.  
We illuminate each of these stages through empirical material from contemporary maritime 
ordering processes. We show how ordering emerges in response to new problems and is driven 
by practical activities geared at coping with and governing these. According to the model, once 
a new problem emerges (problematisation), informality allows for experimenting with new 
practices and developing new knowledge (informalisation and experimentation). Once these 
experimental practices become codified through ‘best practices’, ‘lessons learned’ and other 
instruments they increasingly settle (codification). If they resist controversy and contestation, 
they may produce a newly settling order. The principles of the new order may then further 
consolidate and spread through activities such as capacity building or the spread of best 
practices geared at educating and training practitioners in the new ways of handling things 
(consolidation). 
The model of pragmatic ordering has the potential to make visible practical processes that have 
often flown beneath the radar of much International Relations (IR) scholarship. As a new way 
of studying the emergence of international orders, the model allows for consideration of 
informal and experimental forms of governance, and a better grasp of short-term and 
incremental political transformations, as well as bringing us closer to the practical activities of 
those engaged in building orders. We translate core insights from pragmatist philosophy and 
practice theory into a concrete model for the empirical study of ordering processes.  
Our argument proceeds in three steps. In section two we introduce core insights from recent 
moves towards ordering in the IR literature and consider what understandings of order and 
change evolve from these. We pay particular attention to recent pragmatist and practice 
theoretical debates. Drawing on these core premises, we then outline the five stages of the 
pragmatic ordering model.  
 
4 Emanuel Adler, World Ordering. A Social Theory of Cognitive Evolution (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2019), Daniel H. Nexon and Iver B. Neumann, ‘Hegemonic-Order Theory: A Field-
Theoretic Account’, European Journal of International Relations, 24:3 (2018), pp. 662–86. 
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The remainder of the article then uses empirical material from the oceans to flesh out each of 
the stages of the model. We start out with a general discussion of the problematisation of 
maritime space implied by the new maritime security agenda. The next section zeros in on a 
paradigmatic case. We study the Western Indian Ocean in order to demonstrate how 
informality and experimentation drive the formation of new practices and the emergence of 
new orders at sea. We discuss how these new practices consolidate and spread. We end in 
discussing the specificities of the case. Since the power of paradigmatic case studies is not only 
to elaborate a model, but also to invite comparisons, we draw some general lessons for the 
maritime and other international orders.  
 
2. From orders to ordering 
The question of how to conceptualise and empirically study order and change remains one of 
the most pertinent theoretical challenges in IR theory. In particular, the recognition that 
international relations are subject to forms of order other than the modern international system 
of sovereign states has since the 1970s led to a growing range of conceptual proposals for (sub-
)orders including ‘regimes’, ‘regions’, ‘communities’ and other forms of normative and 
ideational structures.5 Although one of the main intentions of introducing such concepts was 
to account for the emergence and transformation of orders, these proposals have been 
frequently criticised for offering too static a picture and remaining weak in understanding 
change.6  
Responding to such critiques, a wave of scholarship has drawn on recent ideas, concepts and 
structural metaphors from social theory to advance alternatives. Inspired by pragmatist 
philosophy, practice theory and related approaches, scholars have put forward relational and 
 
5 Janice Bially Mattern, Ordering International Politics. Identity, Crisis and Representational Force 
(New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 28-32. 
6 Trine Flockhart, ‘The Problem of Change in Constructivist Theory: Ontological Security Seeking and 
Agent Motivation’, Review of International Studies,1:22 (2016), pp. 799-820. 
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process-oriented proposals of order. ‘Assemblages’7, ‘actor-networks’8, ‘communities of 
practice’9, ‘fields’10, or ‘pragmatic networks’11 present such new concepts of order.  
What unites these proposals is that they question the usefulness of a binary division between 
order and change. They focus instead on the plurality of international order, including 
nestedness and overlap within and between orders, and the importance of ongoing processes of 
ordering within these. While not a homogenous circle of scholars who cite and follow each 
other’s works or share a distinct objective, there are enough common ideas and a shared 
intellectual project to justify speaking of an emerging movement. The core ideas of the 
‘ordering movement’ revolve around an emphasis on process, practice and a pragmatist model 
of change.  
Arguing against a dichotomy which contrasts stability and order with change and disorder, the 
call for ordering emphasises process. The new concepts of order aim to offer simultaneous 
accounts of change and stability recurring through processes of learning, evolution, innovation, 
or translation.12 Order is hence neither seen as a given, nor as being continuously in flux, but 
as an achievement that requires enactment and reproduction. As Ray Koslowski and Friedrich 
Kratochwil argued early on, “any given international system does not exist because of 
immutable structures, but rather the very structures are dependent for their reproduction on the 
practices of the actors.”13 Practices, understood as organised patterns of activities, become the 
core unit of analysis to understand order and the locus of change. 14 These notions, as developed 
in IR, conceptualise orders as patterns of practice and relations between them.  
 
7 Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (California: 
Universities Presses of California, 2006). 
8 Martin Müller, ‘Opening the Black Box of the Organization: Socio-Material Practices of Geopolitical 
Ordering’, Political Geography, 31:6 (2012), pp. 379–88. 
9 Adler, ‘World Ordering’. 
10 Nexon and Neumann, ‘Hegemonic Order’. 
11 Deborah D. Avant, ‘Pragmatic Networks and Transnational Governance of Private Military and 
Security Services’, International Studies Quarterly, 60:20 (2016), pp. 330-342.   
12 Adler, ‘World Ordering’; Christian Bueger and Frank Gadinger, International Practice Theory, 2nd 
edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). 
13 Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, ‘Understanding Change in International Politics: The 
Soviet Empire’s Demise and the International System’, International Organization, 48:2 (1994), pp. 
216. Related early arguments using the concept of practice can be found in the institutionalism of James 
G. March and Johan P. Olson, ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders’, 
International Organization, 52:4 (1998), pp. 943–69. 
14 The core premises of practice theory are outlined in Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, 
‘International Practices’, International Theory, 3:1 (2011): 1–36; and Bueger and Gadinger, 
‘International Practice Theory’. 
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Ordering is a continuous process of adjustment. It requires innovation, but also repetition and 
maintenance work. It therefore implies a performative element; that is, how in and through 
action, new orders or new components of them emerge, and an ostensive element; that is, how 
that which has already been established, such as expectations or rules, is re-enacted and 
maintained in a situation. Order in this sense is reproduction and we can speak of a ‘settled 
order’ if the ostensive elements dominate. However, the indefiniteness and uncertainty of new 
situations generate context-specific reinterpretations of existing practices. These in in turn 
force and facilitate fresh approaches, which in their (at least partial) innovation, represent more 
than pure repetition. 15  
Ted Hopf clarified that such a focus offers two potential understandings of change: one based 
on the principle of indexicality, the other based on deliberate reflection.16 The principle of 
indexicality suggests that, since no two situations or actors are the same, any enactment of a 
practice in a given situation implies adjustment and hence transformation. This leads to an 
incremental understanding of change. Following Hopf, a second understanding is to see change 
as the outcome of deliberate practical reflection on how to proceed in the face of difference, an 
acceptable alternative, a crisis situation, or an innovation.17 This brings to the fore a pragmatist 
understanding of change, which associates transformations with crisis moments; that is, when 
routines and existing rules are challenged through a new experience or a problem which 
existing practices are ill-equipped to deal with.18  
Our intention in the following is to take these key insights from the ordering movement 
forward. Yet, instead of adding further philosophical abstraction, our ambition is to turn them 
into a model useful for understanding how ordering occurs in actual international practice, such 
as those processes evolving in response to the maritime security agenda. Following Clarke and 
 
15 Andreas Reckwitz, ‘Toward a Theory of Social Practices: A Development in Culturalist Theorizing.’, 
European Journal of Social Theory, 5:2 (2002), pp. 555. 
16 Theodor Hopf, ‘Change in International Practices’, European Journal of International Relations, 24:3 
(2017), pp. 687-711. 
17 Hopf, ‘Change in International Practices’.  
18 Ulrich Franke and Gunther Hellmann, American Pragmatism in Foreign Policy, (Oxford Research 
Encyclopedia Politics, 2017); Ulrich Franke and Ralph Weber, ‘At the Papini Hotel - on Pragmatism in 
the Study of International Relations.’, European Journal of International Relations, 18:4 (2011), pp. 
669–691; Sebastian Schmidt, ‘Foreign military presence and the changing practice of sovereignty: A 
pragmatist explanation of norm change. ’, American Political Science Review, 108:4 (2014), pp. 817–
829; and Simon Frankel Pratt, ‘Pragmatism as ontology, not (just) epistemology: Exploring the full 




Primo, models have to be understood as productive fictions.19 They are “partial representations 
of objects of interest” and their accuracy is limited.20 A model hence does not offer testable 
propositions, nor should it be judged by its accuracy or truthfulness, but by its ‘elegance’ and 
how well it serves the purpose at hand.21 As such, models operate as tools or “mediating 
instruments”, made of a “mixture of elements”22 of “bits of theory” and “bits of data”23.  
The model of pragmatic ordering presented in the following draws together the abstract 
premises from the ordering movement and empirical insights from current global governance 
research. It then refines the model through the analysis of a carefully chosen paradigmatic case 
from the re-ordering of the maritime space. Paradigmatic case studies are means for rendering 
phenomena such as ordering intelligible; they are, as Pavlich puts it, “designed to reveal” and 
particularly useful for developing models.24 They allow for exploring mechanisms in depth and 
open up a space for comparison and contrast with other cases.  
 
3. Pragmatic Ordering: A five stage model 
On the basis of the core assumptions of the ordering movement, we propose a model in which 
new orders emerge in response to new problematic situations. Orders are constructed in 
practical activities geared at coping with and governing problems. They are hence the effects 
of the practical everyday ordering and coordination work of diverse actors dealing with 
problems. This work is not necessarily directed towards establishing formal and legal rules and 
is often informal and ad hoc in character. The principle of experimentation, of identifying and 
testing mechanisms and responses to cope with and order problems, structures such practices. 
Since new problems tend to involve high levels of uncertainty, pragmatic ordering relies 
heavily on epistemic practices, expertise and knowledge production.  
 
19 Kevin A. Clarke and David M. Primo, A Model Discipline. Political Science and the Logic of 
Representation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
20 Clarke and Primo, ‘A Model Discipline’, p. 9. 
21 Clarke and Primo, ‘A Model Discipline’, p. 8, 12-13; Andrew Abbott, Methods of Discovery. 
Heuristics for the Social Sciences (New York: Norton, 2004), p. 34. 
22 Margaret Morisson and Mary S. Morgan, Models as Mediating Instruments, in Models as Mediators: 
Perspectives on Natural and Social Science, Mary S. Morgan and Margaret Morisson (eds.) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.14. 
23 Clarke and Primo, ‘A Model Discipline’, p. 8. 
24 George Pavlich, Paradigmatic Cases, in Encyclopedia of Case Study Research, Alberts J. Mills, 
Gabrielle Durepos and Elden Wiebe (eds.) (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2010), 646; as well as Bent 
Flyvbjerg, Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research, in Qualitative Research Practice, 
Clive Seale, Giampietro, Gobo, Jaber F Gubrium, and David Silverman (eds.) (London and Thousand 
Oaks: Sage, 2004), 420–34. 
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These dimensions together form a model of transformation. This begins with the emergence of 
a new problem. Established practices (routines, rules and procedures) do not allow for the 
problem to be adequately addressed, while its novelty creates uncertainty. In the face of 
uncertainty, new practices and knowledge are required to grapple with the new problem. Actors 
resort to informality and experiment, since there are insufficient settled practices or formal 
rules to follow. Informality provides the space for experimentation. Conditions of informality 
provide the flexibility to try new solutions, include new or different actors but also to 
accommodate potential failures of experiments. Experiments require expertise, but in turn also 
lead to new knowledge as the outcome of the tests are recorded. Once a new set of practices is 
developed, these may increasingly become settled as actors strive to codify them in best 
practices, lessons learned or practical agreements and install, maintain and institutionalise 
them. In time, and if they resist controversy and contestation, these practices may instantiate a 
new order, which in turn becomes nested in or part of the established orders governing a 
particular domain (see Fig. 1). Each of these stages is further elaborated below.  
 








Orders develop along and in response to new problematisations. A problematisation occurs 
once collectives are concerned about a distinct situation, consider it problematic and start to 
attend to it. In the process of ‘problematisation’ actors identify what the challenges are and 
how they might be addressed. Problematisation has been identified as vital component of 
contemporary politics by pragmatist philosophy, in particular John Dewey’s political theory. It 
is also a central theme in the work of Michel Foucault, and the driving idea in economisation 
and securitisation research. All of these approaches provide important clues into the logics of 
problematisation.  
In Dewey’s pragmatist political theory politics arises primarily to solve problems of the 
commons. For Dewey the starting point for politics was the rise of what he called a 
‘problematic situation’, that is a situation in which issues cannot be solved through private 
interaction.25 When a problematic situation arises collectives face difficulties in proceeding by 
everyday routine and a process of major public adjustment is required.26 For Dewey, such 
situations trigger a process of ‘inquiry’ geared at identifying the meaning of the problem and 
how it can be best addressed.27  
With many parallels to Dewey, Foucault develops an understanding of politics that takes 
problematisation as the starting point.28 With the concept of problematisation he referred to the 
practical conditions and institutional mechanisms under which something is turned into an 
object of knowledge in response to a dedicated situation. 29 For Foucault, problematisation 
implies “the transformation of a group of obstacles and difficulties into problems to which the 
diverse solutions will attempt to produce a response”.30 Problematisation refers to a process 
that starts out from the recognition that a common issue exists that requires political action. 
Uncertainty arises over how newly emerging issues should be dealt with and whether and how 
existing routines can be adjusted to do so. It evolves through attempts to connect issues, sort 
the problem dimensions, define its boundaries, and identify strategies and solutions to cope 
with it.  
 
25 John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (New York: Swallow Press, 1946). 
26 Mark B. Brown, Science in Democracy: Expertise, Institutions, and Representation (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2009), p.141. 
27 Brown, ‘Science in Democracy’.  
28 Roger Deacon, Theory as Practice: Foucault’s Concept of Problematization, Telos, 118 (2000), 
pp.127-142; Paul Rabinow, Dewey and Foucault: What’s the Problem? Foucault Studies, 11 (2011), 
pp. 11-19.  
29 Deacon, ‘Theory as Practice’, p. 131. 
30 Michel Foucault, The Foucault Reader (New York: Pantheon, 1984), p. 389. 
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Both Dewey and Foucault hold that problematisation produces new practices.31 As Foucault 
reasoned in Discipline and Punish32 for instance, “the problematization of discipline 
established a deep set of motivating constraints that facilitated the emergence of new practices 
of punishment in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These concrete new practices then 
reinforced the more diffuse disciplinary problematic”.33 
Problematisation has become a core theme in contemporary social research. In IR, a classic 
insight is John Ruggie’s argument that international cooperation starts out from the negotiation 
of a collective situation whereby an agreement is reached between actors concerned about a 
particular problem.34 For Ruggie such situations are inherently unstable in that they depend on 
available knowledge and the degree to which a given set of actors are concerned about it.35  
Problematisation is also the core logic applied in securitisation as well as economisation 
research. Here research investigates particular types of problematisation, namely how 
particular issues are rendered problematic in terms of the extra-ordinary responses of security 
or the market solutions of the economy.36 As is shown in both of these research programs, the 
actors of problematisation can be quite varied, with emphasis on industry, state administrations, 
civil society and activists, but also scientists and analysts taking a pivotal role.37 On the one 
hand, new problematisation processes provide the opportunity for new actors to take the stage. 
On the other, contexts of problematisation are not free of power relations, which implies that 
voices from certain positions will exert greater influence in defining a problem than others.  
 
 
3.3 Informalisation and Experimentation 
 
31 Rabinow, ‘Dewey and Foucault’.  
32 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison (New York: Random House, 1977) 
33 Collin Koopman and Tomas Matza, Putting Foucault to Work: Analytic and Concept in Foucaultian 
Inquiry, Critical Inquiry, 39:3 (2013), p. 827. 
34 John G. Ruggie, International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends, International 
Organization, 29:3 (1975), pp. 557–583. 
35 Ruggie, ‘International Responses to Technology’. 
36 Thierry Balzacq, Securitization Theory. How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2011); Donald MacKenzie, Fabian Muniesa and Lucia Siu, Do Economists Make Markets. 
On the Performativity of Economics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007) 
37 Trine V. Berling, Science and Securitization: Objectivation, the Authority of the Speaker and 
Mobilization of Scientific Facts.”, Security Dialogue, 42:4–5 (2011), pp. 385–97; MackKenzie, 
Muniesa and Siu, ‘Do Economists Make Markets’. 
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Problematisation occurs when existing rules and procedures struggle to cope with a particular 
problematic situation. While problematisation might imply that actors work within existing 
practices and institutions, it may also open the space for reconfigurations in the ways in which 
this situation is addressed, including the emergence of novel roles for actors, or the entry of 
new and different actors. Such situations are often characterised by ‘informality’. 
Informalisation can be understood as the explicit attempt to develop responses outside of 
formal institutions and their rules.  
As Friedrich Kratochwil notes, informal modes of world politics are increasingly important 
and widespread as the direct outcome of the proliferation of problems in quantitative terms, but 
also in consequence of their quality and complexity.38 Substantial evidence supports this 
observation. The majority of post-Cold War political transformations are permeated by 
informal processes, such as soft law, contact groups, expert panels, or pragmatic networks.39 
Indeed, many recent global political innovations can be traced directly back to informal 
processes, often involving actors other than states.40  
Informality is an important lens through which to observe practices that fall outside publicly 
recorded formal and legalised international organisations and to empirically scrutinise the de 
facto actors participating in ordering. The focus on informality also brings to the fore the wider 
range of practical agreements that actors develop and rely on, such as Memoranda of 
Understanding, Codes of Conduct, or Best Practices.  
Informality provides the basis for experimental politics and inquiry. It provides the space to try 
out new responses and include new and other actors in the process. As Dewey argued, 
problematisation is a spur to inquiry and experimentation.41 In response to the uncertainty and 
 
38 Friedrich Kratochwil, The Status of Law in World Society. Meditations on the Role and Rule of Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 102-108. 
39 See, among others, Jochen Prantl, Informal Groups of States and the UN Security Council, 
International Organization. 59:3 (2005), pp. 559–92; Vincent Pouliot and Jean-Philippe Therien, Global 
Governance in Practice, Global Policy, 9:2 (2018), pp.163–72; Ramesh Thakur, Andrew F. Cooper and 
John English, International Commissions and the Power of Ideas (Tokyo, New York, Paris: United 
Nations University Press, 2005); Deborah D. Avant, Pragmatic Networks and Transnational 
Governance of Private Military and Security Services, International Studies Quarterly,  60:20 (2016), 
pp. 330-342. 
40 An example is the Responsibility to Protect doctrine: proposed by a blue ribbon panel, it was 
discussed at a UN reform summit before it was embraced in the formal UN bodies (Gareth Evans, The 
Responsibility to Protect. Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All (Washington: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2008) 
41 Brown, ‘Science in Democracy’; Tanja Bogusz, Experimentalismus und Soziologie. Von der Krisen- 
zur Erfahrungswissenschaft (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2018). 
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novelty of a new problem, actors tinker, develop and test new practices.42 Recent research 
supports that theoretical argument. It shows how important the experimentalist logic is for 
many current global governance processes.43 As De Búrca, Keohane, and Sabel argue, 
experimentalist governance is driven by a logic of problem solving, probing, and testing.44 
While certainly involving diplomatic protocols, such processes tend to be more informal in 
nature and not focused on establishing rules and enforcing compliance. Experimentalism is 
hence a distinct mode of practice in international relations, characterised by tinkering, testing, 
and knowledge production.  
Knowledgeable actors and epistemic practices are critical to understanding pragmatic ordering 
processes. Knowledge is needed not only to develop common understandings of the problem 
and new coping strategies, but also to record the success and failure of experimental solutions.45 
Knowledge production is thus a vital feature for understanding pragmatic ordering. Science 
and knowledge production should not be considered as falling outside an ordering process; they 
are an inherent part of it. Consider the importance of deterrence theory in shaping the rise of 
the nuclear order as a case in point,46 or the rise of transnational terrorism as an international 
problem, which was, as Stampnitzky argues, closely linked to the emergence of the terrorism 
expert and the new discipline of terrorism studies.47 Knowledge production is a core practice 
of ordering and of deriving and documenting the experiments conducted.  
 
3.4 Codification and Consolidation 
The last stages in the model concern the processes through which the new practices become 
settled, start to become routine and are translated and adopted across local situations. 
Codification initially entails recording the results of experimental practice. These records are 
 
42 Bogusz,‘Experimentalismus und Soziologie’; Astrid Schwarz, Experiments in Practice (New York & 
London: Routledge, 2014). 
43 Gráinne De Búrca, Rober O. Keohane, and Charles Sabel, Global Experimentalist Governance, 
British Journal of Political Science, 44:3 (2014), pp. 477–86; Mark T. Nance and Patrick Cottrell, A 
Turn toward Experimentalism? Rethinking Security and Governance in the Twenty-First Century, 
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then stripped of histories of failures and condensed into documentations of what works.48 
Codification can take place through, for example, lessons learned exercises, the production of 
manuals, or the identification of best practices. Such texts then potentially start to be used in 
training, for instance in capacity building projects or in education. If widely adopted such 
documents may come to function as customary or soft law. As Bernstein and van der Veen 
note, best practices can become the de facto prevalent mode of governance in an issue 
domain.49  
Consolidating and installing new practices in such a way, potentially implies contestation and 
resistance. Even if evidence for the success of the new practices is overwhelming, as proposals 
for new ways of handling things they are likely to be challenged by those vested in previous 
ways of doing things. New practices will thus only settle and stabilise if they withstand such 
resistance and controversy, and this in turn is rarely a friction-free process. It is only then that 
the order fully consolidates. This might imply that a full settlement or consolidation is never 
reached if new practices meet ongoing resistance or refutation.  
 
3.5 Summary 
These five stages delineate the model of pragmatic ordering and outline an alternative for the 
study of emergence of orders on the basis of practice-theoretical and pragmatist assumptions.  
As a model based on pragmatist and practice theoretical assumptions it is not without 
limitations. Pragmatist approaches tend to be criticised for downplaying the importance of 
power.50 As Avant stresses in responding to such critiques, while power does not necessarily 
feature as an explicit concept, the processes described in pragmatist analyses capture generative 
understandings of power and new forms of distributing power relations.51  
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49 Steven Bernstein and Hamish van der Veen, Best practices in global governance, Review of 
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October 2017, pp. 13-14. Available at <http://www.dhnexon.net/wp-
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Discussing the role of power in conceptualisations of ordering, Guzzini suggests that, “even if 
power systematically refers to order, order does not need to be defined through power”.52 In 
this sense, the model of pragmatic ordering evokes understandings of power, but does not 
define its core processes through it. In so far as the move to ordering implies a focus on process 
and change, it connects power not to domination and control, but to how the repositing through 
processes such as problematisation or informalisation generates new dispositions and forms of 
agency. The focus hence turns to forms of power that are generative in nature, and 
conceptualised through notions such as ‘deontic’, ‘performative’, ‘protean’ or ‘productive’ 
power.53  
Pragmatic ordering is, to reiterate, a model, and as such it is an abstraction. While this allows, 
as shown above and below, the illumination of certain processes and the integration of 
important existing empirical results from global governance research, it will be less useful for 
understanding others. The model is particularly suited to understand those situations where 
novel problematisations are in play and where considerable uncertainty on how to proceed 
arises. It is likely that in more settled, less uncertain and fluid situations, other forms of ordering 
might prevail, which in turn are also shaped by other dispositions and power relations.  
Moreover, the model posits a linear logic. In practical terms, at each of the stages of the model 
there is a risk that the process breaks down. In practice we cannot assume a frictionless process. 
A shared problematisation might become challenged, contested and renegotiated, or the 
agreement to resort to informality, experimentation and knowledge production might collapse 
and actors may resort to other modes of ordering. The model then invites us to explore why 
and how such breakdowns might occur.  
In the next sections we substantiate the model of pragmatic ordering in the light of a 
paradigmatic case of the transformation of maritime order. We demonstrate the heuristic power 
of the model and refine its elements through the empirical case. To do so we show how, in the 
past decades, the new problematisation of maritime security gradually emerged. Briefly 
investigating some of the core features of this problematisation, we zoom in on the case of the 
Western Indian Ocean to provide concrete illustrations of informalisation, experimentation and 
consolidation.  
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4. Re-Problematising the maritime  
Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s the oceans were not understood to be a problematic 
space requiring major international political attention.54 In other words, a particular order 
governing the oceans had become increasingly settled. The rules and principles governing the 
oceans were established and agreed. The period from the 1970s through the 1980s saw the 
consolidation of a series of international maritime regimes, the most important of which was 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The development of these 
maritime regimes did much to embed commonly agreed norms and practices of political order 
at sea, whether in relation to the stewardship of marine resources or the free passage of 
commerce and the demarcation of territorial waters. At the same time, the end of the Cold War 
diffused the major naval confrontation of the period between the forces of NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact. Indeed, by the end of the Cold War, the sea appeared in many respects to have 
become an increasingly well-ordered space; characterised by legal regulation, normative 
agreement, and, generally speaking, pacific relations between states.55  
With the new millennium, the advent of novel international security challenges at sea led to a 
new problematisation of the oceans captured in the ‘maritime security agenda’. This 
problematisation has led to a wave of experimentation and practical innovation and with it new 
processes of ordering the sea. Below we provide a brief reconstruction of the maritime security 
problematisation, before zooming in on a pragmatic region to discuss informalisation, 
experimentation and codification in greater empirical detail. This is both to illustrate the core 
stages of pragmatic ordering, and to indicate how the model provides a heuristic for empirical 
research.  
 
4.1 The rise of a maritime problem space  
 
54 Although sporadically, international security concerns brought some attention to the oceans, such as 
the hijacking of the Achille Lauro in 1985, the ‘tanker war’ in the Persian Gulf in 1984-7, and the so 
called ‘turbot war’ between Canada and Spain in 1994-6. 
55 Yet, from the 1980s onwards there was a growing awareness for the health of the oceans and gave 
rise to an environmental problematisation. Our analysis focuses on security at sea.  
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What can be described as the ‘maritime security agenda’, is a process through which the 
maritime space comes to be seen as inherently problematic. The emergence of transnational 
and sub-state maritime insecurities, as well as the re-emergence of geo-political rivalries, 
contestation and doubts over the legal regime at sea have created new uncertainties. These new 
insecurities disrupted the established maritime order of the immediate post-Cold War period. 
This in turn led to uncertainty over how newly emerging obstacles and difficulties should be 
dealt with and whether and how existing practices could be adjusted to cope with them. The 
new problematisation set in motion a complex ordering process at sea.  
As several reconstructions have shown, maritime security as a concept and integrated set of 
problems has its roots in the rise of maritime piracy and incidents of maritime terrorism, 
beginning in the late 1990s.56 More holistic thinking that conceives of the maritime as an 
interconnected security space develops from the mid-2000s. This was reflected in the growing 
attention given to maritime security issues both in the academic discourse and also in state 
administrations and international governance forums.57 
A major indication of this new problematisation of the maritime are the considerable efforts 
that international actors have devoted to the drafting of national and regional maritime security 
strategies. The United States published the first exemplar, when in 2005 the Bush 
Administration concluded its work on the National Strategy for Maritime Security.58 This 
document was the first strategy of its kind to explicitly conceive of the maritime sphere as a 
differentiated security space in its own right, identifying proliferation, terrorism, transnational 
organised crime at sea, piracy, environmental destruction and illegal seaborne immigration as 
core challenges.59  
The US strategy has since been followed by a host of similar work by international actors. The 
UK, France, Spain, the European Union, the African Union and the Group of 7 amongst others 
all completed such documents between 2014 and 2015. In common with the US strategy, these 
approaches endeavour to connect different maritime threats and to understand and engage with 
 
56 See Christian Bueger, What is Maritime Security? Marine Policy, 53 (2015), pp.159-164; Christian 
Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime Security Studies, 
International Affairs, 93:6 (2017), pp. 1293–1311; Basil Germond, The Geopolitical Dimension of 
Maritime Security, Marine Policy, 54 (2015), pp. 137-142. 
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58 U.S. Government, The National Strategy for Maritime Security (2005), p.2. Available at < 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/homeland/maritime-security.html> Accessed 30 
November 2020. 
59 US Government, pp.3-6. 
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the maritime arena as an inter-linked security space rather than a series of discretely separated 
challenges. Security strategies function as mechanisms through which governments and other 
actors in the security sphere attempt to articulate and grapple with the problems in which they 
are engaged. Their recent proliferation is, at least in part, an indication of the extent of the new 
problematisation of the sea.  
 
4.2 Features of the maritime security problematisation 
As documented by the strategies, the maritime security problematisation contains at least four 
features. The first relates to an increasingly significant role of non-state actors in challenging 
maritime order. Non-state actors have always been prominent in the maritime arena, not least 
because of commercial interests in trade and resource exploitation. However, what is new – or 
at least newly resurgent – is the advent of non-state actors as security threats. Such threats fall 
into three main categories.  
The first relates to extremist violence and terrorism. Such concerns were initially spurred by 
an al-Qaeda attack on a US warship in 2000. This raised fears of a rise in terrorist activity at 
sea, and led to a drive to secure ports and coastal areas from the incursion of terrorist groups 
and materials, including potentially weapons of mass destruction. Second, the rise of piracy in 
Southeast Asia, Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Guinea from the late 1990s onwards caused 
major concerns over the disruption of international shipping routes, the associated financial 
and human costs, and the need to formulate an effective response.60 Finally, various organised 
criminal groups have utilised the sea to facilitate their activities, whether those be the 
trafficking of weapons and narcotics or the smuggling of people.61 Such concerns have been 
heightened since the European migrant crisis in 2015 and the importance of maritime 
smuggling routes in facilitating these movements. 
Another feature of the new problematisation relates to the expansion of the maritime 
stewardship agenda and an increasing tendency to link this to issues of economic and food 
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security in coastal states and communities, as well as to the health of the global economy as a 
whole. At least 80 per cent of global trade by volume travels by sea, while marine resources 
such as fisheries and offshore oil are key economic assets.62 Most obviously, piracy, criminality 
or other forces of maritime disruption threaten global commerce. More ambitiously, however, 
there is also a new recognition amongst coastal developing countries that the sustainable 
exploitation of marine resources offers a potential route to development, as captured by the 
concept of the blue economy. Moreover, that past neglect of these areas has led to their 
predation by outside actors, whether by fishing vessels or other external interests. In 
consequence, there has been an explosion of interest both in the marine economy itself, and 
also in the structures required to protect, manage and police it.  
A third feature relates to issues of human security; in the sense of the insecurities experienced 
by individuals and local communities. Human security issues penetrate much of the maritime 
security agenda. Migration into the EU across the Mediterranean for example is driven by 
human insecurities at home, while the action and process of migration is itself a source of often-
deep insecurity to those participating in it. Fisheries protection and sustainability underpins the 
livelihoods of millions of people living in coastal regions, while these same groups are often 
the most vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change or marine pollution. Such 
concerns relate both to the security of the individuals and coastal communities themselves, but 
also to the role of human insecurities in facilitating the emergence of activities such as piracy 
or criminality as alternative sources of employment in regions of significant economic 
deprivation or breakdown.63 
The final feature concerns the rise of geopolitical challenges and new competition at sea, 
induced by the rapid increase in naval capacity of states such as India and China.64 This rise of 
new naval powers has been accompanied by a proliferation of relatively cheap and easy to 
access maritime warfare technologies such as anti-ship missiles and submarine forces to a much 
wider range of state (and sometimes non-state) actors than was the case in the past. This in turn 
has challenged the competitive advantage enjoyed by the long dominant naval forces of the 
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West, at least in certain specific geographic domains.65 Concurrently, the period since 2001 
has seen the emergence of new flashpoints of geopolitical tension and territorial competition 
at sea, including particularly the South China Sea, and nascently the Arctic.66 These 
developments have gone along with the fundamental contestation of key norms governing the 
sea established by the UNCLOS, in particular through China’s claims in the South China Sea.67 
Taken together, these features give us a good grasp of the advancement of a new 
problematisation of the sea. We now turn to the second stage of the model and review the 
manner in which international actors are responding to this. 
 
4.3 The paradigmatic case 
In the following we zoom in on the paradigmatic case of the Western Indian Ocean – the 
maritime region reaching from South Africa in the West to India in the East, and Yemen and 
Pakistan in the North.  
Paradigmatic cases are useful for rendering particular phenomena intelligible; akin to reasoning 
by analogy.68 We here draw on the paradigmatic case of the Western Indian Ocean to illuminate 
the subsequent four stages of our model. While problematisation is a more overarching 
phenomenon and as shown above can be usefully reconstructed in a more abstract manner, 
understanding the later stages requires to zoom in closer on a situation in which 
problematisation spurs particular practical responses.  
The Western Indian Ocean is a useful paradigmatic case since it functions as a microcosm of 
the global maritime space and has been a pivotal region for the new problematisation of the 
sea. The region is an area of critical global geostrategic significance and is internationally 
recognised as presenting a diverse and complex range of maritime security challenges that 
incorporate all the themes we identify above.69 It is the location for major geopolitical and 
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naval interactions between a diverse range of states; it has seen the most virulent outbreak of 
piracy in the modern period; it borders hotspots of terrorist activity in Somalia, Yemen and the 
wider Middle East; it incorporates key trafficking routes for narcotics, humans and arms; and 
has played host to rampant illegal fishing activities, and other forms of organised crime.  
In addition, and in so far as a paradigmatic case “simultaneously, if paradoxically, emerges 
from, and constitutes, the set to which it belongs”70, the Western Indian Ocean is also host to 
significant processes of informalisation, experimentation and codification processes. The case 
is hence ideally suited to further illuminate how these processes unfold and hang together. The 
Western Indian Ocean has been a crucible of innovation in maritime security with multiple 
experiments leading to practices that not only structure interactions in the region itself, but are 
increasingly indicative of a new global ordering process. The developments in the region hence 
give us a case of prototypical value both for understanding the specificities of the ordering 
implied by the broader maritime security problematisation, but also for the general model of 
pragmatic ordering.  
 
 
5. Informality and Experimentation in the Western Indian Ocean 
What practical responses has the problematisation of maritime security triggered in the Western 
Indian Ocean?71 In the following we show how problematisation gave rise to a host of 
informally-derived experiments. We investigate three of the experiments that are observable in 
the region:72 1) the development of new coordination mechanisms for naval forces, 2) the 
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creation of an experimental governance mechanism to coordinate actors and establish practical 
rules, and 3) the introduction of a new form of law enforcement structure. Each of these 
responses are informal in that they operate with a minimum of rules, and neither rely on formal 
legal agreements nor are organised in the frame of established institutional settings. They are 
experiments in that they test new means of responding to maritime insecurity. They draw on 
the reconfiguration and translation of practice from other fields, new actor configurations, and 
the introduction of new technologies to the maritime. Together they provide us with indications 
of what forms of informality and experimentation might be spurred by problematisation. 
 
5.1 New means of military coordination 
Naval responses to maritime insecurities in the region, in particular piracy off the coast of 
Somalia, have led to remarkable informal and experimental forms of military coordination. 
These work in the absence of any shared command structures or formal commitments of states. 
Instead, coordination is facilitated trough frequent information sharing meetings as well as 
information technology. As Sarah Percy notes, these novel mechanisms are not adequately 
grasped by any familiar notions such as alliances, coalitions or partnership and are truly 
experimental.73 
The first precedent for such a coordination structure was set when a multi-lateral naval 
operation was installed in the region in 2002 as a response to concerns over maritime terrorism. 
The so-called Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) was a new type of multi-naval arrangement.74 
At its launch five states were part of the arrangement, but the number grew quickly to 31 
nations, including regional powers such as Pakistan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The CMF has a 
flexible and informal structure. It works “without long-term binding commitments” and rotates 
command among member states every couple of months”.75 The flexible and informal 
character is well captured on the CMF website:  
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Participation is purely voluntary. No nation is asked to carry out any duty that it is 
unwilling to conduct. The contribution from each country varies depending on its 
ability to contribute assets and the availability of those assets at any given time. The 31 
nations that comprise CMF are not bound by either a political or military mandate. 
CMF is a flexible organisation.76 
The main tasks of the CMF are carried out by a range of task forces commanded by member 
states in rotation, with the US naval headquarters in Bahrain providing the basic command 
infrastructure. The activities that navies engage in range from “assisting mariners in distress, 
to undertaking interaction patrols, to conducting visiting, boarding, and search-and seizure 
operations, to engaging regional and coalition navies.”77 The creation of the CMF represents 
an initial case for how the emerging maritime problem space led to experimentation with a new 
type of military operation and a standing multi-naval constabulary force in the Western Indian 
Ocean. CMF became one core element in the maritime security structure of the region, and 
when from 2008 piracy became a major issue it was one of the forces that reacted to it by 
creating a dedicated task force.  
To respond to piracy two additional multilateral forces started to operate in the region. NATO 
launched Operation Ocean Shield and the EU created EUNAVFOR Atalanta.78 Also a broad 
range of state actors, including China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Russia began to send 
naval vessels. The UN Security Council gave these navies a broad mandate to operate in the 
area and also in Somali territorial waters. Yet, counter-piracy was not a formal UN naval 
peacekeeping mission, and there were no proposed joint or integrated command structures. 
Instead, drawing on experience with the CMF, naval actors developed an informal coordination 
mechanism.  
The so-called Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Mechanism (SHADE) was established in 
2008 to conduct informal discussion and de-conflict the activities of the diverse nations and 
organisations involved in counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa.79 Initially, SHADE 
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included only the CMF, EU NAVFOR and NATO participants, but it rapidly expanded to 
incorporate all navies active in the area, including those of China, India, Japan, Russia, South 
Korea and Ukraine. By 2012, 14 organisations and 27 countries were active SHADE 
participants.80 The novelty of the SHADE arrangement, and the opportunities it offered for 
addressing common problems, was recognised by a representative of the US State Department, 
who described the organisation as:  
…not… a coalition [which] implies [centralized] command and control. Instead [there 
are] three organized missions and a wide variety of national independent deployers who 
have simply chosen to collaborate. No one is in charge. No one has command. They 
deconflict and operate constructively, and that’s a new model of operation. […] many 
countries are voluntarily collaborating to secure the maritime space.81  
One of the most successful measures developed by SHADE was the Internationally 
Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) – a demarcated patrol area in which the coverage by 
naval vessels was maximised through computer modelling.82 The IRTC not only reduced the 
size of the area of operations, but also allowed “more concerted task-sharing between the three 
multinational deployments”.83 The basis for the Corridor’s operation in practice is the IRTC 
Coordination Guide, “a gentlemen’s agreement to keep the number of ships per area within the 
IRTC to a minimum”.84 
A second noteworthy initiative facilitated by SHADE was the creation of a new information-
sharing platform called MERCURY. MERCURY allows various actors – including national 
navies, civil information sharing centres and law enforcement agencies – to communicate with 
each other through synchronous text-based chat, with a live feed on naval operations and piracy 
incidents providing real time data to all participating actors.85 “This secure but unclassified 
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internet-based communication system, […] works as a neutral communications channel and 
allows all SHADE participants to coordinate together in real time”.86  
The CMF force structure, the SHADE forum, the transit corridor optimised through modelling, 
and the information sharing system, are four novel ways of how to coordinate military activity 
between nations and to increase the success rate of responding to maritime security incidents. 
They were all launched in an informal setting, are experimental in character, and have endured 
over time.  
 
5.2 An Experimental Informal Governance Mechanism 
By 2008, piracy in the region had become a problem of significant proportions – a threat to the 
delivery of aid to Somalia as well as to international shipping. The question arose as to which 
international governance body could oversee, coordinate and legitimise counter-piracy 
activities. It quickly became apparent that the existing institutional set up was struggling to 
address the problem. The UN Convention of the Law of the Sea defined piracy as a criminal 
activity taking place on the high seas. It gave any state the right to arrest and prosecute pirates 
but did not give anyone the obligation to do so. The IMO, the UN body in charge for regulating 
the shipping industry, discussed the issue, but lacked the means to authorise or organise any 
larger scale multi-lateral response. The issue was transferred to the UN Security Council. A 
series of UN Security Council resolutions called upon states to protect shipping and to 
cooperate in doing so. But it remained unclear which body could develop a strategy and 
coordinate the increasing number of different actors involved, in particular flag states, regional 
states, as well as the shipping industry.  
The response was the creation of a new informal governance mechanism, the Contact Group 
on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). The group has been described by scholars 
variously as an “international cooperation mechanism to act as a common point of contact”, as 
a “forum where a considerable number of States meet to discuss issues related to the effective 
repression coordination mechanism”,87 “more as a transnational network than governance, as 
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it lacks any direct regulatory power”,88 or as “a voluntary mechanism for states to collectively 
address maritime piracy”89.  
A former chairperson of the group described it as a “diplomatic initiative” that grew into an 
“expansive, elastic, multi-faceted mechanism” that “has acted as a lynchpin in a loosely 
structured counter-piracy coalition” but that has “no formal institutional existence”.90 Another 
described it as “an inclusive forum for debate without binding conclusions” without “any real 
structural formality”.91 And, indeed, the group has been described by the participants 
themselves as “a laboratory for innovative multilateral governance to address complex 
international issues”.92 
The group as such is a fascinating case of informality that evolved through a series of 
experiments and exerted significant structuring power over the counter-piracy response. 
Created as a coordination body by 15 states in 2009,93 it was originally meant to be a limited 
contact group, following the templates of other state groupings regularly formed to address 
international crises.94 But the group very quickly evolved into an entire new form. The CGPCS 
became a process-driven, informal organisation working on principles of inclusivity rather than 
representation. It grew in membership, with over 80 states and 25 international organisations 
participating. Also, non-governmental organisations started to attend, as did shipping industry 
associations. Despite its size, the CGPCS worked with a minimum of rules, which left many 
of its procedures to the discretion of a rotating chairmen, while the work was decentralised in 
a series of working groups.  
The main objective of the group was to serve as fora for the exchange of information 
concerning ongoing operations, to develop a shared understanding of the problem of piracy, to 
discuss new proposals for responses, and to develop a concerted strategy. Although the 
decisions of the CGPCS are non-binding in nature, they exert a substantial orchestrating 
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effect.95 The group experimented with coordination mechanisms, such as a shared legal toolkit 
or a coordination matrix and database.96 In particular it has facilitated the development of a 
legal system on the basis of memoranda of understanding by which piracy suspects could be 
arrested, transferred, prosecuted and jailed across different jurisdictions.  
 
 
5.3 A new legal infrastructure 
The cross-jurisdictional legal structure developed to prosecute pirates is another noteworthy 
experiment in regional maritime security.97 It arose from the practical problem that most of the 
states providing naval forces for counter-piracy operations were unwilling to prosecute 
detained piracy suspects in their own courts for legal, financial or political reasons, despite 
being given the right to do so under UNCLOS. To avoid suspects simply being released, 
international actors debated various options for prosecuting pirates, including the proposal for 
establishing an international court in Tanzania.98  
The majority of actors engaged in counter-piracy, however, preferred a more informal and less 
institutionalised system that would not set legal precedents or lead to a formal institution. This 
system was developed within the legal working group of the CGPCS. As a former chairmen of 
the legal working group phrased it, the group developed  
“a unique legal and practical framework for prosecuting pirates in the region, also 
known as the Post Trial Transfer system. The framework allows arresting states to 
transfer apprehended suspected pirates to littoral states, including Kenya and 
Seychelles, for prosecution, and, if convicted, to have the pirates transferred to Somalia 
(Somaliland) to serve their prison sentence”.99  
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The bases of the system are bi-lateral Memoranda of Understandings. For international criminal 
lawyers the cross-jurisdictional coordination framework was a hallmark for inventing 




The three processes detailed above are examples of experiments that have been engendered by 
the failure of existing practices. The provisions by UNCLOS and the mechanisms developed 
within the IMO were insufficient to address the situation. Rather than creating a formal 
organisation such as a new naval operation, an international court, or orchestrating a response 
through UN structures, a loose and informal set of multi-lateral activities were developed to 
respond to multiple maritime insecurities, but particularly the piracy problem.  
The outcome has been the experiments discussed above. It is noteworthy that these 
experimental activities have not receded with the dissipation of the piracy problem in the region 
from 2012. Indeed, there are clear indications that they are beginning to consolidate into settled 
practices and become routine. In the next section, we show how these new practices have 
become codified through lessons learned and strategy documents, and how capacity building 
activities increasingly install and embed these into the littoral states of the region and 
elsewhere.  
 
6. Codification, Consolidation and Global Translation 
The last recorded major successful piracy attack in the Western Indian Ocean occurred in May 
2012. Eight years later the measures discussed above remain in place, and in many ways have 
consolidated. This is the outcome of increased explicit efforts to install these practices among 
the littoral states, and hence embed them in the region as a whole, but also to expand these 
practices to other maritime regions.  
 
6.1 Codification, Consolidation and Capacity Building 
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Both SHADE and the CGPCS engage in ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the effects of 
their activities, recorded for instance in the frequent communiques of the groups. In addition, 
several actors began to devote significant attention to recording experience and conducting 
lessons learned exercises, indicating a substantive process of codification. In 2014 the CGPCS 
initiated a major ‘lessons learned’ exercise. Following its experimental spirit, the group 
commissioned a think tank and a university-based researcher to carry out the project. The 
objective was to record the experience of the group and distil lessons and best practices through 
a participatory approach. “Lessons learned” has become a standing item on the agenda of the 
groups plenary meetings.101 Several actors including various states, NATO, and the shipping 
industry either contributed to the CGPCS process or conducted their own lessons learned 
exercises.102 The goal of these exercises has been to capture the practices installed, why they 
succeeded in containing piracy, how they could be maintained and whether and how they could 
be replicated to address other maritime security problems and regions.  
Consolidation occurred also through an effort to transfer the responsibility for maintaining the 
by now settled practices to regional actors in order to make them enduring and even permanent. 
In consequence, international actors continued to experiment, and, in so doing, shifted the focus 
of their activities towards the institutionalisation of the new practices in the region. In 
particular, new experiments have been conducted in capacity building.103 These initiatives are 
meant to enable littoral states to take over key tasks from the international community. They 
also represent an effort to incorporate and address some of the broader issues raised by the 
maritime security agenda, addressing in particular the economic and human security 
dimension.  
Capacity building is geared at training practitioners of countries in the new practices. Such 
activities have been part of counter-piracy operations in the region from the very beginning. 
Regional actors were trained in systems such as MERCURY, and increasingly given major 
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roles in the CGPCS. Capacity building was notably important to enable littoral states to play a 
part in prosecuting piracy suspects as part of the legal transfer system.  
The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), for instance, created a new programme to 
undertake such capacity building for maritime security.104 The focus became soon broader and 
programmes evolved into training regional diplomats and maritime security actors in order to 
allow them to take over the core tasks of maintaining the regional structures. The IMO and the 
EU, but also states such as the US and Japan invested substantially in capacity building 
operations. Yet, such capacity building efforts have not been without contestation and present 
and ongoing challenge, which suggests that the new practices are not fully consolidated.105  
 
6.3 Translating the new practices to other situations 
In what ways does this consolidation process also affect other regions? There are numerous 
indications that the results of the experiments in the Western Indian Ocean have also been 
translated to other regions and situations and hence have a wider, global ordering effect. Core 
practices from the Western Indian Ocean region have been adopted elsewhere, and many of the 
developments are paradigmatic of wider trends in the emergent maritime security agenda.  
In the Gulf of Guinea, for example, a governance mechanism similar to the CGPCS, the so-
called G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea Group, was established in 2013. In 2018 a contact 
group was created to coordinate responses to piracy in the Sulu and Celeb Seas which took the 
CGPCS as a template. The SHADE coordination model has been adopted in other regional 
contexts. A similar mechanism has been introduced in Southeast Asia, as well as in the 
Mediterranean as a means to coordinate the fight against human smuggling.106 The flexible 
military operational structures that allow for the participation of non-member states is in use in 
various naval operations, such as NATO’s Mediterranean naval counter-terrorism operation 
Active Endeavour. Capacity building for maritime security has become a global enterprise. A 
good indicator is the evolution of the UNODC’s programme: Starting out as the Counter-Piracy 
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Programme operating in four countries (Kenya, Somalia, Seychelles, Tanzania), it has since 
has evolved into the Global Maritime Crime Programme active in capacity building around the 
world.  
These are examples of how the practices developed and tested in the Western Indian Ocean 
became replicated across the globe. They form part of the new pragmatic ordering process at 
sea and signify an increasing consolidation of these activities and practices beyond the Western 
Indian Ocean region for which they were originally developed.  
 
7. Conclusion: Ordering and the new pragmatic order at sea  
The problematisation of the maritime security agenda has spurred a pragmatic ordering process 
through which the oceans are increasingly governed differently. It presents a forceful, 
paradigmatic case for how problematisation, informality and experimentation lead to new 
orders through codification and consolidation. It is the power of paradigmatic cases to 
illuminate and elaborate,107 and this was the primary intention of our empirical discussion; it 
was to show how the model of pragmatic ordering can shed new light on global ordering 
processes.  
Informalisation and experimentation are observable master trends of world politics, and are 
increasingly recognised as such. The model of pragmatic ordering allows us to put these trends 
in context and relate them to the occurrence of ordering. The model hence gives us a new tool 
to study change in international orders. It allows to translate the often-intricate philosophical 
ideas of pragmatism concerning the importance of problems, inquiry, and change, but also the 
insistence of practice theories to pay more attention to the mundane, practical, often informal 
activities into a concrete model useful for empirical research on ordering.  
Problematisation processes are critical in this regard. The maritime security problematisation 
came along with the identification of new and inter-related security challenges at sea. 
Uncertainties over how to deal with these challenges opened space for informal and 
experimentational processes to occur. New kinds of military cooperation, the use of 
technology, experimental governance formats, and a complex law enforcement system were 
the outcome. 
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Nonetheless, it is likely that not every problematisation will favour or trigger the pragmatic 
ordering process induced by the model. Indeed, a case can be made that ocean space is 
particular prone to such a form of problematisation. Given the terra-centrism of much of world 
politics, there might be a case that the oceans operate differently. And indeed, navies 
historically have stronger inclinations to cooperate, not the least given the fluidity of ocean 
space and extreme weather conditions. The status of ocean space in world politics, without 
doubt, represents particular conditions, and as such it is an ideal paradigmatic case for 
advancing the pragmatic ordering model.  
Yet, the core driver of the model is the rise of new problematisations induced by the failure of 
existing ways of handling things. In the case of counter-piracy off the coast of Somalia, this 
was not the lack of legal provisions, but the failure of existing institutions, centrally the UN 
system, to organise a practical response. Piracy is interesting in this regard, since it is also a 
case of an old international problem, that resurfaced, raised new uncertainty and hence required 
a new and different response.108 New uncertainty and the failure or absence of settled practices 
hence provides the core conditions for the model to set in motion. 
Paradigmatic cases, like our discussion of the maritime security ordering process, are also 
meant to be of prototypical value and open up comparisons.109 We expect the model to be a 
revealing heuristic tool if applied to other cases and compared to the maritime security case. 
We expect the model to provide valuable insights in how newly emerging issues and problems 
challenge existing orders and trigger new ordering process.  
A range of contemporary issue areas will benefit from being researched through these lenses. 
State failure, transnational terrorism, cyber security, artificial intelligence, or autonomous 
weapons represent emerging global problematisations that induce significant ordering 
processes. Like the maritime security problematisation, these are recognised problems that are 
inherently complex, transnational and cross-jurisdictional in the way in which they manifest, 
and in which pragmatic responses are engendered both as a function of their nature and as a 
consequence of the specific territories in which they take place.   
Yet, the pragmatic ordering model will also be useful for historical research and investigations 
into how orders, such as the international humanitarian order have evolved through 
problematisation, informality and experimentation and have become settled.  
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Comparing these instances with our paradigmatic case will contribute to refining the model 
and better identify its scoping conditions. Key questions relate to the situations and 
particularities of the problematisations required to trigger pragmatic ordering processes, and 
the circumstances under which the stages of the model could break down. These include when 
and how informality and experimentation fail due to controversies, how new practices fail to 
settle and the ways in which they may be contested or resisted and hence consolidation does 
not take place. Investigating such issues will also bring questions of power, in particular the 
power to shape the outcomes of experiments, or to refuse or resist consolidation more strongly 
to the fore than it is currently captured in the model.  
As March and Olson argued in 1998, “the historical processes by which international political 
orders develop are complex enough to make any simple theory of them unsatisfactory.” 110 The 
model of pragmatic ordering developed in this article does not pretend to offer such a simple 
theory. As a model its goal is to organise, illuminate and provide a heuristic for exploration, 
not a theory to be tested.111 Likely, there are other mechanisms of change and ordering at play, 
within which (maritime) orders are nested, and that are nested within it; and other models and 
conceptual apparatuses are required to describe them. The model of pragmatic ordering is, 
however, an important addition to our repertoire of models how (global) ordering occurs. It is 
a model that brings problems, informality and experimentation to the fore. 
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